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Review Essay

Unsubsidizing Suburbia
The Urban Origins of Suburban Autonomy. By Richardson
Dilworth, Harvard University Press, 2005.

Reviewed by Nicole Stelle Garnett†
In my local government law course, I frequently begin by
observing that local governments are both important and underappreciated for the same reasons: they pick up trash, fix
potholes, and treat sewage. Richardson Dilworth’s political history of metropolitan New York City and northern New Jersey1
supports my observation—although I continue to doubt that it
is the most effective sales pitch to law students. By highlighting the connection between public infrastructure and suburban
political autonomy, Dilworth’s book also provides an important
opportunity to consider how infrastructure policies shape metropolitan America.
Dilworth uses several case studies of late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century suburbs to link suburban political
autonomy to public investments in water, roads, and sewers.
He argues that big cities (here New York City, Jersey City, and
Newark) developed infrastructure relatively early and then
sought to use the promise of extended public works projects to
entice their suburban neighbors to join them. Suburbanites
wanted the services that big cities could offer, but worried that
annexation meant political corruption and higher taxes. Suburban governments which developed infrastructure independently remained autonomous; some which lagged behind sacri† Lilly Endowment Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
I thank David Barron, Patricia Bellia, Alejandro Camacho, Lee Anne Fennell,
William Fischel, Richard Garnett, Bob Jones, John Nagle, Richard Schragger,
and Julian Velasco for helpful comments and suggestions. Krista Steinmetz
provided valuable research assistance.
1. RICHARDSON DILWORTH, THE URBAN ORIGINS OF SUBURBAN AUTONOMY (2005).
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ficed their political independence to gain needed services.2 Over
time, as urban governments perfected infrastructure development techniques (and employed more and more engineers who
could sell their services to developing suburbs), it became easier for suburbs to achieve political autonomy. Municipal consolidations and annexations became rare, leaving us with the
hodgepodge of municipal governments that characterizes all
American metropolitan areas.3
Dilworth’s careful study does highlight the connection between infrastructure development and suburban political
autonomy, but his thesis—that suburban infrastructural investments somehow caused metropolitan fragmentation4—is
unconvincing and unproven. One is struck when reading this
book that the real origin of suburban autonomy is the suburban
desire to remain autonomous. Suburbanites then—like suburbanites now—preferred to maintain their independence from
urban governments whenever possible. Certainly, some cities
expanded geographically by promising needed services to their
suburban neighbors. A well-known example is the annexation
of the San Fernando Valley to Los Angeles in 1913,5 an uneasy
marriage of convenience achieved with the promise of water
that almost unraveled several years ago when a majority of
Valley residents voted to secede and form their own municipal
government.6 Other suburban communities turned away urban
suitors because early investment in public works projects made
annexation unnecessary. But, most interestingly, still others
chose to spurn annexation and needed services because of worries that rapid development threatened their suburban identity.
This book is an impressive work of history. Dilworth promises more, however, and a serious shortcoming of the book is his
failure to apply the history to current debates about metropolitan governance. While Dilworth does refer to these debates, his

2. See, e.g., id. at 25–27.
3. See id. at 32–35 (discussing the relationship between infrastructure
development and metropolitan fragmentation).
4. Id. at 11.
5. See id. at 25 (describing Los Angeles’s decision to supply water to outlying communities only if they were annexed to the city).
6. See Sue Fox & Patrick McGreevy, Secessionists Weigh Options, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at B1 (noting that a slim majority of Valley residents approved of seceding from Los Angeles, but that state law required city-wide approval).
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efforts at drawing connections between the historical case studies and modern local government policy are fleeting and unsatisfactory. As a result, many readers might question Dilworth’s
broad assertion that microhistories connecting infrastructure
development and suburban autonomy at the turn of the twentieth century have continued relevance today. This is unfortunate. Modern policymakers could, in fact, benefit from understanding why—for example—Brooklyn consolidated with New
York City and Yonkers did not. This Essay represents my own
brief, and far from complete, effort to follow through on Dilworth’s promise to connect the history presented in this book to
modern local government and land use policy.
As a prelude to that discussion, the Essay draws three lessons from Dilworth’s study. First, this book serves as a helpful
reminder that suburban resistance to joining forces with central cities has deep economic and psychological roots. This is
not a hopeful history for proponents of regional governance.
During the period Dilworth studies, some suburban communities may have reluctantly surrendered their autonomy to gain
access to public works, but the tables have turned. Today, urban governments, with their aging infrastructure, might appear to have little to offer their more technologically advanced
suburban neighbors. Second, the book highlights (albeit unintentionally) the degree of autonomy exercised by local governments today. In so doing, this book tends to support the argument that the ills of metropolitan fragmentation stem not from
weak urban governments, but rather from the strong suburban
ones that began to emerge during the time that Dilworth studies.7 Third, and perhaps most importantly, Dilworth highlights
that early suburban governments sought to preserve their
uniquely suburban identities by, among other things, managing
infrastructure development so as to attract the right kind of
residents. By the turn of the twentieth century, it appears that
Charles Tiebout’s market for “consumer-voters” was developing.8
The remainder of the Essay uses these historical lessons to
reflect upon the continuing connection between suburban
growth and public infrastructure policy. Over the course of the
7. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism].
8. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 417–20 (1956).
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past century, rapid suburbanization has left most major American cities landlocked. They are surrounded by dozens (if not
hundreds) of municipalities, many of which incorporated precisely to immunize themselves from annexation.9 It is an article
of faith among antisprawl activists and academics that government subsidization of the kinds of public works that Dilworth studies—roads, water, and sewers—encouraged suburbanization.10 Dilworth seeks to add an interesting twist to this
commonly accepted tale. While many scholars have explored
the link between public works subsidies and suburban
sprawl,11 he connects these subsidies to the beginnings of metropolitan fragmentation, which itself fosters sprawl.12
Many economists applaud metropolitan fragmentation, arguing that it promotes competition between local governments.
Because impediments to mobility are reduced within metropolitan areas, a citizen may leave a locality with regulatory, tax,
and public-goods priorities that are incompatible with her preferences and locate in one that offers more attractive policies.
Thus, fragmentation may increase governmental responsiveness and efficiency by subjecting local authorities to some ap-

9. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 73–77 (describing
this process of defensive incorporation); see also NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 37–38 (1994) (discussing incorporation as a response to threat of annexation and higher taxes); GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE
POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 79 (1981) (asserting that avoidance of
annexation led to incorporation of multiple suburban localities near Los Angeles). On fragmentation, see Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1118–20 (1996)
[hereinafter Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem].
10. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 795 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing causes of sprawl, including subsidies for
roads and sewers). But cf. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 67 (2001) (“Many commentators nonetheless claim that local governments continue to subsidize sprawl . . . . [T]his
myth . . . continues to be an article of faith among the antisprawl set.”).
11. See, e.g., KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 130–32 (1985) (discussing the “massive
public investments in roads, storm sewers, street lighting, curbs and gutters,
playgrounds, and schools . . . necessary for growth”).
12. DILWORTH, supra note 1; see, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, SelfInterest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2015
(2000) (arguing that fragmentation “inculcates a narrow conception of selfinterest”); Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 236 (2001) (recounting the “malign” account of suburbanites’ behavior).

GARNETT_3FMT

2005]

12/22/2005 10:52:24 AM

UNSUBSIDIZING SUBURBIA

463

proximation of market forces.13 Metropolitan fragmentation is
not, of course, costless. Fragmented local power virtually guarantees that local governments’ decisions will affect neighboring
municipalities in both positive and negative ways.14 Increasing
numbers of local government and land use scholars have called
for greater consolidation of local power in order to address the
negatives, especially suburban sprawl and the stark economic
and demographic differences within metropolitan areas.15
These scholars propose a variety of institutional reforms to
curb interlocal externalities and ensure a more equitable distribution of public resources. This debate has produced a rich
literature that engages deep normative questions about the
meaning of community, the purposes of local government, and
the value of decentralized decisionmaking.
This Essay uses Dilworth’s case studies of early metropolitan fragmentation as a springboard for discussing the continued connection between public infrastructure investment, suburban growth, and intrametropolitan equity. In particular, the
Essay examines the tendency among opponents of metropolitan
fragmentation to embrace limits on infrastructure subsidies as
one solution to the sprawl problem. These “new infrastructure

13. See, e.g., John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market
Metaphor and America’s Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 74 (1997)
(asserting that “[d]iverse policy regimes can cater to heterogeneous preferences”); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73, 83–86 (Dennis C. Mueller
ed., 1997) (arguing that interlocal competition will increase efficiency in production of public goods); Richard E. Wagner & Warren E. Weber, Competition,
Monopoly, and the Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas, 18 J. L.
& ECON. 661, 684 (1975) (“[A]n increase in the number of competing and overlapping governments will lead the public economy more closely to perform as a
competitive industry.”); see also MARK SCHNEIDER, THE COMPETITIVE CITY:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA 63–69 (1989) (purporting to find that
tax rates are lower in more fragmented metropolitan areas).
14. As Clayton Gillette has observed, it is a “truism” that “[t]he actions of
local governments affect their neighbors,” sometimes in negative ways. Gillette, supra note 12, at 190.
15. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA (1994); GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING 143–65 (1999) [hereinafter FRUG,
CITY MAKING]; MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS 74–104 (1997); NEAL R.
PEIRCE, CITISTATES 291–325 (1993); DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS
(1993); Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 9, at 1144–
64; Cashin, supra note 12, at 2027–47; Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841,
1906–13 (1994); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
253, 316–28 (1993) [hereinafter Frug, Decentering].
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policies”16 have intuitive appeal: if infrastructure subsidies foster sprawl and enable metropolitan fragmentation, then limiting subsidies should limit sprawl (and perhaps fragmentation
as well). Unfortunately, however, using infrastructure policies
to curb suburban growth and rein in municipal autonomy may
have negative distributional consequences including, importantly, a loss of affordable housing and a related reduction in
opportunities for intrametropolitan mobility.
I. THE SUBURBAN ORIGINS OF
SUBURBAN AUTONOMY
Most of Dilworth’s book consists of microhistories of four
urban consolidation efforts in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries: New York City’s effort to annex Yonkers in
the early 1870s,17 the consolidation of greater New York City in
1898,18 Jersey City’s expansionist ambitions in the late 1860s
and early 1870s,19 and the “Greater Newark” movement in the
early twentieth century.20 The history of the decisions that gave
this important region its modern political shape is, standing
alone, a fascinating one, and Dilworth provides a dauntingly
detailed account of the various factors influencing these decisions. In his introduction and conclusion, however, Dilworth
asserts that his account, with its particular focus on the provision of city infrastructure, helps explain the political fragmentation that characterizes modern metropolitan regions.21 In an
effort to understand whether—and why—this claim is valid,
this part of the Essay focuses on three ways that Dilworth’s
historical account sheds light on the current debates about the
growth and governance of modern metropolitan America.22

16. Throughout this Essay, I use the term “new infrastructure policies”
because these efforts represent a significant departure from the century-long
pattern of public subsidization that developed around the time that Dilworth’s
study begins. I use the term “new” for convenience, despite the fact these policies began to emerge over three decades ago. See ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSÉ
A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ WITH ARNOLD M. HOWITT, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS 18–33 (1993).
17. DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 51–62.
18. Id. at 90–107.
19. Id. at 108–51.
20. Id. at 152–93.
21. Id. at 1–10, 194–201.
22. See, e.g., Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note
9, at 1115 (“The governance of metropolitan areas is the central problem for
local government law today.”).
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First, the parallel attitudes toward “big cities” a century ago
and today serve as a helpful reminder that suburban aversion
to urban governments is nothing new. Second, the evolution of
local government power over the past century—from the truly
disabled city governments that Dilworth describes to municipalities armed with broad home-rule authority—makes suburban aversion to joining forces with their urban neighbors all
the more difficult to overcome. Third, and perhaps most importantly, by emphasizing the early connection between public infrastructure and suburban development, Dilworth helpfully
highlights the roots of modern ambivalence about suburban
growth. The suburbs that Dilworth studies already understood
the importance of local infrastructure policy. By shaping public
works projects, many of these late nineteenth-century communities were able to define their own, suburban, identities—to
remain independent from territory-hungry urban neighbors, to
attract the right kind of residents to migrate to their borders,
etc. This pattern, which has replicated itself many thousands of
times over the course of the past century, continues to shape
our metropolitan regions today.
A. SUBURBAN IDENTITY AND SUBURBAN AUTONOMY
Dilworth’s book seeks to illuminate why metropolitan
fragmentation began to emerge during the late nineteenth century. Dilworth painstakingly accumulates evidence suggesting
a correlation between suburban communities’ decisions to incorporate independently or join another municipality and the
level of investment in public works.23 Ultimately, however,
while he makes the case that early investments in public works
helped shape the political landscape in New York and New Jersey,24 his account falls short of its promise causally to connect
urban infrastructure and suburban autonomy. Instead, if these
tales prove anything, it is that suburban communities remained autonomous whenever possible. Suburbanites then, as
suburbanites now, saw urban governments as corrupt, inefficient, tax-generating leviathans. They reluctantly joined their
urban neighbors only when they could see no other alternative.
Several themes dominated the debates surrounding the
urban annexation and consolidation efforts that Dilworth studies. All of them will be familiar to those attuned to modern de23. DILWORTH, supra note 1, passim.
24. Id.
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bates about metropolitan governance. First, late nineteenthcentury suburbanites believed—with reason—that urban governments were corrupt and inefficient. Interestingly, the very
public works projects that cities used to lure their suburban
neighbors frequently were the font of the corruption. Most famously, in 1870, a state senator named William Tweed succeeded in securing the enactment of a new “home-rule” charter
for New York City.25 Senator “Boss” Tweed became the first
commissioner of the public works department under the new
charter, where he proved to have a true gift for marshalling
public-works-related graft into political power.26 Not surprisingly, the desire to remain “clean” and avoid “machine” politics
played a central role in many suburbs’ decisions to spurn annexation proposals—even if it meant turning away a promise of
needed services. In response to a proposal by Jersey City to annex neighboring Bayonne, for example, the local paper warned
that “every improvement would degenerate into a job, and only
those streets would be opened for which the ring received the
most money.”27
Suburbanites also associated urban governments—and the
services that they promised—with high taxes. The Bayonne
Herald article quoted above, for example, warned that annexation by Jersey City would mean higher taxes to “fill the pockets
of ‘patriotic’ place hunters and political thieves.”28 Opposition to
Jersey City’s expansion plans in Hoboken—a town that had
been privately developed as a “suburban location where one
could escape the trials of the big city, such as yellow fever and
‘heavy taxes’”29—also centered on the tax burden associated

25. Id. at 47.
26. See id. at 43 (noting that as early as the 1850s, the term “laying pipe”
had come to refer to the patronage and corruption generated by construction of
the Croton Aqueduct); id. at 47 (discussing the rise of Boss Tweed).
27. Id. at 138; see also id. at 73–74 (noting that Mount Vernon’s decision
to remain independent coincided with “shocking revelations” about the extent
of corruption in New York City); id. at 74 (quoting a newspaper article observing that opposition to a Greater New York proposal in Queens County was motivated by “fear of Tammany”); id. at 86–88 (arguing that Brooklyn narrowly
approved on consolidation with New York because, at the time, New York
City’s “reform” government was viewed as preferable to Brooklyn’s own machine politics); id. at 129 (quoting a newspaper editorial suggesting that Hoboken consolidation with Jersey City threatened residents with “the disease
ringology or ringold prevailing there”) .
28. Id. at 138.
29. Id. at 121.
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with the expanded infrastructure.30 In Hoboken and elsewhere,
residents were willing to accept fewer services rather than risk
the high taxes and corruption associated with infrastructural
development.31 Dilworth makes a convincing case that Newark’s cautionary approach to infrastructural development in
the late nineteenth century, driven by a fear of taxes and municipal debt, set the stage for the city’s failed efforts to expand
during the early twentieth century.32
Finally, and most interestingly, Dilworth’s case studies illustrate the extent to which suburban decisions to remain
autonomous were driven by an emerging suburban identity. A
number of historians have linked the early development of
American suburbs with the rise of an antiurban ideal during
the late nineteenth century.33 Kenneth Jackson has observed,
for example, that as early as the mid-nineteenth century,
“[s]uburbia, pure and unfettered and bathed by sunlight and
fresh air, offered the exciting prospect that disorder, prostitution, and mayhem could be kept at a distance, far away in the
festering metropolis.”34 Dilworth’s book provides ample evidence that early suburbanites’ desire to separate themselves
politically, as well as geographically, from urban life (and immigrant and minority urban residents) drove opposition to annexation in many communities. Early suburbanites saw their
communities as a way to escape the perceived chaos of city life.
Two years before residents of Mount Vernon, New York, rejected a proposal to consolidate with New York City, the incoming mayor opined in his inaugural address,
This city is purely a place of residence, a home. The hum and noise,
the smoke and steam, with the hurry and bustle of traffic . . . is all
absent here. The quiet of the villa, the park, the pleasant lawn, the
modest, substantial and beautiful home characterize Mount Vernon.
A large majority of our citizens go into the great metropolis daily, and
there amid the din and strife, fight the battle of life, leaving their
peaceful homes meantime in our care.35

30. Id. at 128–29.
31. See id. at 110–11 (“Infrastructural development would probably have
proceeded at a quicker pace in Hoboken had residents approved consolidation.
Instead . . . residents appear to have voted by a majority against consolidation
because of concerns about political corruption and taxation.”).
32. Id. at 154–65.
33. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning
Law and the Home-Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1205–06
(2001) (reviewing literature).
34. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 70.
35. DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 73.
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Even in Brooklyn, which we hardly think of as a suburb
today, the main opposition to the Greater New York proposal
came from “the ‘Protestant social elite,’ who saw their ‘city of
homes’ as a place of moral virtue that would be defiled by a
closer association with New York City.”36
Dilworth makes a particularly strong case that this ethnic
and moral superiority undermined the early twentieth-century
“Greater Newark” movement. For example, residents of nearby
Bloomfield were concerned that annexation by Newark would
introduce “Sunday activities” associated with Newark’s large
immigrant German population.37 At a public meeting on the
annexation proposal, one resident repeatedly warned that annexation would mean “beer gardens and Sunday baseball galore.”38 The fact that other Newark suburbs, including Montclair and the Oranges, never seriously considered annexation
was likely also linked to the strong antiurban sentiment in
these affluent enclaves.39 It is hardly surprising that the same
residents who warned that streetcar service threatened to introduce “‘the usual and wretched surroundings which always
follow in its train—the half-way house, the beer saloon, Sunday
picnics, loafers, and other riff-raff ’”40 also rejected Newark’s
annexation proposal out of hand.41
B. THE RISE OF THE AUTONOMOUS SUBURB
Richard Briffault has observed that “[t]wo themes dominate the jurisprudence of American local government law: the
descriptive assertion that American localities lack power and
the normative call for greater local autonomy.”42 Both of these
ideas are strongly associated with Jerry Frug, who has done
much to advance the view that city powerlessness is to blame
36. Id. at 105.
37. Id. at 178.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 181–82.
40. Id. at 174.
41. William Fischel’s work provides an alternative explanation for the
failure of the Greater Newark movement, which did not gain steam until the
early twentieth century. Fischel asserts that suburb-city consolidations ceased
after 1910, as suburbs began to use zoning to immunize themselves from infrastructure-dependent industry. With their residential character guaranteed,
suburbs had less need for the infrastructure that came with consolidation. See
William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 325–26 (2004).
42. Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 1.
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for today’s urban ills. In his important article, The City as a Legal Concept, Frug argues that cities are, legally speaking,
rather pathetic creatures.43 For the reasons that Frug describes
in detail, a city’s legal status can only be fully understood
against the backdrop of the historical evolution of the modern
American corporation. Prior to the early nineteenth century,
American law made no distinction between public and private
corporations. A corporation was a corporation—a legally distinct entity empowered by a legislative charter to carry out certain narrowly defined, and frequently “public,” purposes.44 During the early years of the nineteenth century, American legal
thinking underwent a remarkable transformation—the conceptual separation of the “private” and “public” generally, and of
“private” and “public” corporations in particular.45
It is beyond dispute that municipalities did not fare well
from this transformation. Business corporations became independent rights holders, constitutionally protected from unreasonable state interference. Moreover, the gradual erosion of the
ultra vires doctrine and the passage of general incorporation
laws guaranteed the proliferation of private corporations with
broad authority to engage in a wide range of activities.46 In contrast, municipal corporations came to be viewed as subordinate
to—and carrying out the purposes of—the states.47 By the late
nineteenth century, private corporations were well on their way
43. FRUG, CITY MAKING, supra note 15, at 18–25; see also Gerald E. Frug,
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980) [hereinafter Frug,
City as a Legal Concept].
44. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780–1860, at 111–22 (1977); Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note
43, at 1101–02.
45. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 44, at 112–14 (discussing development
of the public/private distinction); Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note 43,
at 1100–04 (discussing separation of public and municipal corporations); Joan
Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law,
64 TEX. L. REV. 225, 232–35 (1985) (discussing the role of municipal corporations in development of public/private distinction).
46. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870–1960, at 77–78 (1992); Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note 43, at
1101 (describing a “Jacksonian effort to pass general incorporation laws, thus
allowing the ‘privilege’ of incorporation to be exercised by all”).
47. Hendrik Hartog’s history of the Corporation of New York City illustrates both the effect of the transformation on our nation’s greatest city and
the remarkably conservative approach that posttransformation municipal
leaders took toward grants of legislative authority. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC
PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870, at 179–258 (1983).
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toward autonomy,48 while city governments had become subject
to state domination.49 Dilworth’s story begins at precisely this
time. Indeed, it is an interesting coincidence that his first case
study examines Yonkers’s 1872 decision to incorporate as a
municipality rather than to be annexed to New York City. That
same year, Judge John Dillon wrote his famously influential
Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations, which
advocated the application of a “super-strong” version of the ultra vires doctrine.50 “Dillon’s Rule” provides that municipalities
have only those powers expressly granted by state law, and,
moreover, that “[a]ny doubt . . . concerning the existence of
power is resolved . . . against the corporation, and the power is
denied.”51 It continues to govern questions of local authority
absent a grant of “home-rule” authority today.52
Dilworth treats the relationship between state and local
governments as merely an interesting backdrop to his series of
interlocal tales. This is unfortunate, for it neglects an important opportunity to learn more about how the evolving balance
between state and local power shaped, and continues to shape,
the metropolitan landscape. State-local relations affected the
outcome of annexation and consolidation efforts in two very different ways. First, during the late nineteenth century, the truly
subservient position of some cities prevented them from developing needed infrastructure. This may have led to consolidation
in some cases. For example, according to Dilworth, weak municipal charters may have led Long Island City and Brooklyn to
consolidate with New York City.53 At one point, the New York

48. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm:
Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485 (1989) (describing “The Middle Period [of corporate development]—the 1850s to the 1880s,”
when “[t]he states enacted ‘general corporation laws’ to assure equal access to
the corporate form”); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 201, 208 (1990) (noting “[t]he pervasive adoption of general incorporation
statutes by many states during the latter half of the 19th century”).
49. See Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note 43, at 1108 (describing
how local autonomy gave way to state control in the late nineteenth century).
50. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 266–67 (6th ed. 2001) (describing inception of Dillon’s
Rule).
51. Id. at 266.
52. See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 506–09 (1999) (explaining Dillon’s
Rule and its application).
53. The 1870 charter incorporating Long Island City, New York limited
the city’s total expenditures to $25,000 per year. While the spending limit rose
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legislature divested Brooklyn—at the time, the third largest
city in the nation54—of virtually all power, giving authority
over essential services such as police and public works to stateappointed commissions.55 On the other hand, Dilworth asserts
(not unconvincingly) that Hoboken’s weak charter, which prevented the development of a municipal waterworks, gave residents a taste for suburban life that led them to reject Jersey
City’s overtures.56 Perhaps, however, Jersey City would have
been better positioned to overcome Hoboken’s concerns if, in
1870, New Jersey had not passed a new charter that “divested
[the city council] . . . of every public function, except that possibly of granting licenses to saloon-keepers.”57
Second, while the struggles over local authority between
large cities and state legislatures are not entirely incongruous
with modern local government law,58 Dilworth fails to appreciate the importance of the emerging legislative deference to
suburban political autonomy. For example, throughout his
study, legislatures granted suburban residents de facto selfdetermination when it came to questions of independence. Today, annexation and incorporation procedures require no direct
intervention by state legislatures.59 The act of municipal government formation is initiated privately, by a petition signed by
some specified percentage of residents or landowners living
within the proposed municipal boundaries.60 This petition is
to $75,000 per year in 1871, the city government lacked funds to provide desperately needed improvements—street lights, pavement, sewers and waterworks. Instead, residents were forced to petition the legislature to create “special commissions” that had the authority to issue bonds for specific public
projects. DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 75–77. Brooklyn’s charter also required
public infrastructure improvements to proceed piecemeal, with the legislature
creating commissions on a project-by-project basis. Id. at 84–85.
54. Id. at 80.
55. Id. at 84.
56. The 1855 charter incorporating Hoboken, New Jersey, restricted municipal expenditures on water to “one dollar per annum, per capita, for every
actual resident in the city.” Id. at 124–25.
57. Id. at 141 (quoting 1 WILLIAM E. SACKETT, MODERN BATTLES OF
TRENTON 87–88 (1895)).
58. Importantly, local governments remain mere “political subdivisions” of
the states. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). They “derive
their powers and rights wholly from the legislature,” which may “destory, . . . abridge[,] and control” them. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 221
(1903).
59. See generally OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 230–33 (2d ed. 2001).
60. Id. at 230–31.
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filed with some intermediate decisionmaker, usually the county
government or trial court, which determines that certain
minimal prerequisites have been satisfied.61 Thereafter, an
election determines whether the area will be incorporated as a
municipality.62 In most states, boundary changes, such as the
annexation of unincorporated territory, proceed according to
similar standardized, and locally-driven, procedures.63
The trend toward general municipal incorporation and annexation procedures began in the first half of the nineteenth
century64 and the New Jersey suburbs that Dilworth studies
may have taken advantage of the state’s “borough” incorporation law to immunize themselves from annexation.65 This “villigification” process has been linked with the emergence of metropolitan fragmentation in the late nineteenth century.66 It is
clear from Dilworth’s account that these procedures were unavailable in New York during the time that he studies. As a result, the state legislature itself issued charters incorporating
municipal governments and specifying their powers; special
legislative action was also required for boundary changes, such
as annexation and consolidation.67 Technically, therefore, suburban residents of nineteenth-century Mount Vernon, New
York, had no power to “decide” whether to approve or reject an
annexation proposal. That decision was solely in the hands of

61. Id. at 231–32.
62. See id. at 231–33; see also Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 74
(“The principal criterion for deciding whether a municipality will be incorporated is whether the local people want it. There are few limits on local discretion.”).
63. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 78 (“As a general rule,
the states no longer provide for annexation or consolidation by special legislative act. . . . Instead, the states have delegated territorial and boundary decisions to the annexing city, the territory to be annexed or the localities to be
merged.”).
64. See FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 208 (discussing “more general and
automatic procedures for incorporation” adopted in the mid-nineteenth century); Jon C. Teaford, The Birth of a Public Corporation, 83 MICH. L. REV. 690,
699–701 (1985) (discussing the trend toward general incorporation).
65. See Albert J. Wolfe, A History of Municipal Government in New Jersey
Since 1798, at 7–8, http://www.njslom.org/history_municipal_govt.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (explaining that the Borough Act of 1878 allowed small
townships to establish themselves as independent boroughs through petition
and referendum).
66. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 150–53.
67. See, e.g., DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 44–51.
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the state legislature; popular votes were purely advisory.68 Yet,
legislators tended to respect local desires.69
Kenneth Jackson has chronicled the extent to which state
legislatures ratified the forcible annexation of suburban communities against the clear wishes of their residents during
most of the nineteenth century.70 He also demonstrates, however, that annexations began to fall in the 1870s, precisely
when Dilworth’s study began.71 Jackson posits three general
explanations for this phenomenon: general incorporations laws
that permitted communities to immunize themselves from annexation, the related abolition of the doctrine of forcible annexation, and substantial improvements in suburban infrastructural capacity.72 Dilworth’s history supports all of these
hypotheses. Clearly, the state legislatures of the time, dominated by rural, Republican, and Protestant interests, shared
suburban contempt for urban government. It is unlikely that
the same legislators who sought to restrict urban power in myriad ways would go out of their way to force consolidation upon
hostile suburban communities. Thus began the pattern of legislative permissiveness toward suburban autonomy that set the
stage for metropolitan fragmentation.73
The legislative deference to suburban autonomy that began
to emerge during the late nineteenth century continues to contribute to intrametropolitan inequities. Most local governments
operate under a broad delegation of power,74 including (in many
cases) “home-rule” authority to advance local interests without
legislative authorization.75 Moreover, once municipal boundaries are established, state legislatures rarely act to change
68. See id. at 90–95.
69. See FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 210 (noting that, after 1850, consolidations and annexations tended to occur only with both parties’ consent).
70. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 147–48.
71. See id. at 149–51.
72. See id. at 152–53.
73. See generally JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL
FRAGMENTATION OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1850–1970, at 5–31, 184–86
(1979).
74. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 1 (“Most local governments in this country are far from legally powerless. Many enjoy considerable
autonomy over matters of local concern. State legislatures . . . have frequently
conferred significant political, economic and regulatory authority on many localities.”).
75. See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2225, 2325–28 (2003) (describing the “initiative” function of home rule,
which authorizes local governments to act without legislative permission).
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them. They also are loathe to interfere with the exercise of local
regulatory authority within them, even when local policies generate significant interlocal externalities.76 Indeed, a strong case
can—and has—been made that central cities’ difficulties stems
from too much local autonomy rather than too little.77 One result of this deference is the local government fragmentation
that characterizes all major metropolitan areas.78
C. THE INFRASTRUCTURE PARADOX
Gerald Frug has suggested that “there is little in the historical account to suggest that city services were designed to
fragment American cities into separate, homogenous components.”79 Dilworth’s book suggests otherwise. His account
chronicles how suburban governments over a century ago understood that they could shape public investments to attract
the right kind of residents and exclude others. By the late nineteenth century, suburban residents—despite their antiurban
leanings—understood that they needed city services. During
the first half of the nineteenth century, a “municipal revolution” had begun:80 “Nineteenth-century cities . . . changed
Americans’ expectations of urban government. Streets were
paved, swamps drained, wells dug, aqueducts constructed, and
police forces hired, as city governments responded to and
shaped unprecedented urban growth.”81 Not surprisingly, urban governments were the first to make these improvements;
population density made infrastructure improvements a publichealth imperative.82 Less populous communities generally were

76. See Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 9, at
1147–48.
77. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 5 (criticizing deference to
local action that generate interlocal externalities); see also Barron, supra note
75, at 2266–71 (describing literature). Frug himself acknowledges as much in
his later work proposing to make local boundaries more permeable in order to
address interlocal inequities created by fragmented local power within our
metropolitan regions. See Frug, Decentering, supra note 15, at 294–300.
78. See Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 9, at
1120 (describing metropolitan fragmentation).
79. Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 39 (1998) [hereinafter Frug, City Services].
80. See generally JON C. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 91–110 (1975).
81. HARTOG, supra note 47, at 4–5.
82. See TEAFORD, supra note 80, at 105–06 (noting that most major cities
had water works by mid-nineteenth century).
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able to defer such expenditures for longer, but eventually circumstances necessitated substantial improvements in suburbia
as well.83
It was at this point in history that urban governments
were poised to use their early investment in infrastructure to
expand geographically, by promising services to suburbs in exchange for annexation. That such exchanges occurred is beyond
dispute.84 For example, support for the “Greater New York”
proposal in the Bronx and Brooklyn likely was driven by a need
to gain access to New York City’s substantial supply of clean
water.85 New York was able to use the promise of expanded infrastructure to annex a number of smaller Westchester County
communities as well.86 In contrast, the late-coming “Greater
Newark” proposal failed in part because of Newark’s city fathers’ long-standing reluctance to make substantial investments in public works. As a result, Newark had less to offer reluctant suburban neighbors that might overcome their concerns
about beer gardens and Sunday baseball.87 Newark’s only successful efforts to expand involved the annexation of a few small
and relatively undeveloped communities.88 Dilworth also makes
case after case that early infrastructural development in the
suburbs correlated with decisions to remain autonomous.89
What is most interesting about Dilworth’s book, however,
is not that some suburban communities reluctantly surrendered their independence to gain needed public works while
others remained independent because they did not need them.90
Rather, the most fascinating stories are of communities that
spurned annexation even when it meant turning away needed

83. See FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 211 (noting that big cities used water
systems as “bait” for suburbs with inadequate, and low quality, water supply).
84. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 144–46 (discussing nineteenth-century
motives for incorporation).
85. DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 56–57, 81–86.
86. Id. at 58–59.
87. Id. at 178–80.
88. Id. at 167–69.
89. Id. at 59–62 (Yonkers, N.Y.); id. at 95 (Mount Vernon, N.Y.); id. at 153
(Irvington and Montclair, N.J.); id. at 171 (Bloomfield, N.J.).
90. Id. at 58–59 (describing Yonkers as “one of the best governed, best
graded, best lighted villages in the country”); see also id. at 74–75 (noting that
Flushing was the only Queens County community to vote against consolidation and that it had the best infrastructure); id. at 93–95 (discussing Mount
Vernon’s rejection of annexation because of independent infrastructural development).
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infrastructure. Dilworth’s case studies suggest that many suburban residents had contradictory feelings about infrastructural development. They realized that public works were
needed to maintain a comfortable suburban lifestyle, but they
worried that these improvements might invite development
that would threaten their peaceful retreats.91 Suburban communities reacted differently to these worries. Some invested in
“premium” infrastructure in an effort to attract the right kind
of residents. As Dilworth observes, in East Orange, New Jersey—a self-styled “progressive residential haven”—public improvements were extensive, but “[t]he cost of progress was . . .
the second-highest tax rate in the county, which had the added
benefit of keeping out undesirable elements.”92 Other communities, however, accepted fewer services rather than risk urbanization. This was the case in Hoboken, where residents continued to rely on private water suppliers rather than invest in an
expensive public water works or consolidate with neighboring
Jersey City.93
The decisions made by these communities further suggest
that early suburban governments had also come to understand
that, sometimes, less is more: rapid development does not always attract the right kind of residents; on the contrary, it may
scare them away. As a result, the preservation of suburban
identity requires careful growth management. Early suburbs,
Dilworth’s work suggests, used infrastructure policy to manage
growth. Undoubtedly, other growth management policies, especially nascent zoning regulations, began to play a role by the
time that his book closes in the early 1920s.94
II. FRAGMENTATION, INFRASTRUCTURE,
AND SPRAWL
The further fragmentation of metropolitan governance in
the decades following this study has only increased the opportunities—and incentives—to engage in such “identity” management, through, among other things, infrastructure policy.
Metropolitan fragmentation both results from and produces

91. See, e.g., id. at 96–97 (discussing this tension in Mount Vernon).
92. Id. at 182; see also id. at 136 (discussing “uniquely suburban” investments in Bayonne, N.J.).
93. See id. at 130 (discussing Hoboken’s response to water shortage).
94. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 41, at 325–33 (discussing rise of exclusionary zoning).
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suburban sprawl. Sprawl causes fragmentation for the reasons
identified in Dilworth’s study—many communities developing
on the urban fringe separately incorporate to form independent
municipal governments. Fragmentation causes sprawl when intermunicipal competition leads local governments to adopt policies that encourage development on the urban fringe.95 As
noted above, government subsidies for the kinds of improvements that Dilworth studies—water, roads, and sewers—
frequently are included among the policy “culprits.”96 The extent to which local investments in public works projects have
contributed to suburban sprawl is not well understood. (One
difficulty with indicting local governments for flawed infrastructure policies is that the federal and state governments often provide the funding—and establish funding priorities—for
“local” improvements.)97 What is clear, however, is that local
government spending of funds from all sources on these improvements decreased dramatically in recent decades.
Until the late nineteenth century, “special assessments”
levied against property owners who benefited directly from the
project funded most public works projects. This method of financing left the decision making about the pace and scale of
improvements in the hands of property owners.98 Generally,
those affected were required to agree to petition the local government to take action.99 As a result, wealthier neighborhoods
usually were the first to receive improvements.100 Around the
time that Dilworth’s study begins, local governments began to
pay for public works projects through general tax revenues.101
A number of different factors might explain this shift, including: a demand for better city sanitation in unimproved commu-

95. See, e.g., Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note
9, at 1134–35; William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 87–88 (1999) (discussing regional business competition as cause of sprawl).
96. See Fischel, supra note 41, at 325–26.
97. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT:
EXTENT OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON “URBAN SPRAWL” IS UNCLEAR 47–48
(1999) (examining and questioning the link between urban sprawl and the
subsidization of federal public water and sewer systems).
98. See JACKSON, supra note 11 at 131.
99. See ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 17 (explaining the
practice, benefits, development, and importance of special assessments for
public works funding in cities).
100. See DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 12–13.
101. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 11, at 131.
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nities;102 the ascendancy of progressive urban elites who sought
to improve the living conditions of the urban masses;103 local
government officials desiring to build their reputation through
successful development policies;104 and, importantly, the demands of suburban residents who argued that public subsidies
would encourage development and strengthen the local tax
base.105
In the 1970s, local government spending on infrastructure
began to decline. A number of interrelated factors explain this
policy shift. By 1965, federal aid to states and localities—
including, importantly, grants-in-aid for physical infrastructure—began to fall short of need.106 A related backlog of new
projects led to concern that the existing infrastructure was
overstretched and undermaintained in many communities.107
This infrastructure “crisis”108 coincided with two major political
developments that caused local officials to reconsider their previous subsidy policies.109 The first was the advent of successful
“tax revolts.”110 Beginning with California’s “Proposition 13,”
voters amended a number of state constitutions to limit local
governments’ ability to raise taxes, especially property taxes.111
Deprived of their primary revenue raising source, cashstrapped local governments struggled to find new sources of
revenue.112 Second, during the same time period, antigrowth
activists began successfully to challenge longstanding assumptions about the benefits of suburban growth.113
While members of the antitax and antigrowth coalitions
were not natural bedfellows, antigrowth policies were and still

102. DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 16.
103. See Frug, City Services, supra note 79, at 39–41.
104. See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 136–43 (1981).
105. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 131.
106. ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 25–26.
107. Id. at 26–31 (connecting infrastructure backlog to a decline in federal
subsidies); see also, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Federal Study Calls Spending on
Water Systems Perilously Inadequate, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 2002, at A22 (discussing the Environmental Protection Agency’s draft report warning that
spending to maintain and expand water and sewer system lags behind need by
tens of billions of dollars).
108. ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 23.
109. Id. at 20–25.
110. Id. at 23.
111. Id. at 23–25.
112. See id. at 25–26.
113. Id. at 20–25.
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are attractive to local governments facing both revenue shortages and pressure to curb development.114 While a complete description of the resulting policies is beyond the scope of this Essay, this Part briefly describes three ways that infrastructure
policy has changed in response to these incentives: First, some
local governments link the pace of suburban growth to infrastructure capacity through so-called “adequacy of public facilities” programs that preclude new development absent construction of public facilities, such as adequate roads, sewers, and
schools.115 Second, a majority of U.S. cities now use development exactions and impact fees, ostensibly to internalize the
cost of new development by forcing developers to fund a wide
range of government infrastructure and services. And third¸
there is a growing support for transferring authority over infrastructure funds to regional entities that will channel public
subsidies, and direct development, in a more rational and equitable manner.
A. ADEQUACY OF PUBLIC FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS
Beginning in the mid-1970s, many local communities began to enforce temporary moratoria in new development projects. Lawmakers justified these restrictions on a number of
grounds. Some, such as the thirty-two-month moratorium in
Lake Tahoe, California that the Supreme Court recently upheld,116 are said to be necessary to promote the government’s
interest in “facilitating informed decisionmaking by regulatory
agencies,”117 who need to deliberate on the pace and scale of development.118 Development moratoria frequently are tied to infrastructural capacity, in part because such moratoria have a
greater chance of surviving legal scrutiny. “Timed” or “phased”
growth programs limit the number of new units that can be

114. See, e.g., James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism, and Diversity: Progressive Planning Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor
and Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 47–48 (2002)
(linking infrastructure limits with antigrowth concerns); Laurie Reynolds,
Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 415–16 (2004) (connecting the rise of exactions for infrastructure with antigrowth consensus).
115. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 10, at 812–13.
116. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 339–41 (2002).
117. Id. at 339.
118. Id. at 311–12.
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built within a specific period of time.119 The regulating
agency—usually a local government—essentially rations permits, awarding them to developments that satisfy certain prerequisites, including the availability and sufficiency of public
services and infrastructure.120
“Adequate public facilities” or “concurrency regulations”
also limit development based upon the infrastructural capacity
by requiring a developer to demonstrate that necessary public
facilities are available before beginning a project, or, in some
cases, requiring a developer to pay fees to ensure that these facilities can be made available concurrently with a development.121 Adequacy of public facilities requirements are widespread. Indeed, many local governments tie development
approvals to infrastructure capacity at least on an ad hoc basis—for example, by denying requests for rezoning or delaying
new subdivision approvals because of concerns about infrastructure shortfalls.122 Local governments impose most formal
adequacy of public facilities requirements. These programs,
which vary in detail, mandate that developers ensure that infrastructural capacity for a new development comports with
preestablished “level of service” standards for the community.123 A handful of states also require local governments to integrate concurrency requirements into local land use policies.124
B. EXACTIONS AND IMPACT FEES
Over the past three decades, increasing numbers of local
governments also have turned to new methods of financing
public works projects, especially land use exactions and impact
fees. Land use exactions generally require developers to provide

119. See, e.g., JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND
USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW § 9.2 (1998).
120. Id. § 5.2 (explaining that judicial approval of a timed-growth program
adopted in Ramapo, New York represented an early victory for growthmanagement proponents (citing Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359
(1972))); ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, MANAGING COMMUNITY GROWTH: POLICIES,
TECHNIQUES, AND IMPACTS 48–53 (1993).
121. S. Mark White & Elisa L. Paster, Creating Effective Land Use Regulations Through Concurrency, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 753, 754 (2003); see, e.g.,
KELLY, supra note 120, at 44–48.
122. See White & Paster, supra note 121, at 755.
123. Id. at 758–62.
124. See FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177(6)(h), .3202(2)(g), .3180 (2005); MD. CODE
ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7B-03(d) (West 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 6086(a)(9)(a) (2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(6)(b) (2005).
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property or public facilities as a condition of receiving regulatory permission to develop. Exactions can be in-kind—the developer must make certain improvements, such as installing
sewers, providing street lighting, or paving roads—or, they can
be monetary, in which case the developer must pay impact fees
in lieu of the in-kind improvements.125 Exactions are, in many
ways, nothing new.126 The Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act,127 adopted in many states in the 1920s, authorizes local
governments to require developers to construct streets, water
mains, and sewers in new developments.128 Since that time,
many local governments have required developers to construct
and dedicate facilities to the community. Over time, communities increased their demand for such dedications from basic infrastructure—sewers, streets, and sidewalks—to property for
public facilities such as schools, fire and police stations, and
parks.129 Today, subdivision regulations routinely require developers to provide certain public improvements as a condition
of receiving regulatory approval.130
While data regarding the nature and extent of local government exactions are lacking,131 it is clear that current practices depart dramatically from earlier antecedents. Importantly, a majority of cities now impose impact fees in addition
to traditional dedications and improvements.132 As Alan Altshuler and Jose Gómez-Ibáñez have persuasively argued, the
shift toward impact fees was an “epochal” one.133 More recently,
a United States Department of Housing and Urban Development report characterized the “increasingly widespread adoption of impact fees” as a “dramatic change in the regulatory en-

125. ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 3.
126. FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 67 (asserting that exactions have been “a
widely used tool in American land-use controls for at least a half a century”).
127. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act is reprinted in DAVID R.
MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES
AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2005).
128. See Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE:
J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 139, 140 (2005).
129. Id.
130. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 119, § 7.7.
131. See, e.g., Been, supra note 128, at 163–64. (calling for more research
on the effects of impact fees on price and growth).
132. Id. at 141 (explaining that 59 percent of cities with more than 25,000
residents imposed impact fees (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LOCAL
GROWTH ISSUES—FEDERAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (2000))).
133. ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 122.
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vironment” and asserted that “communities are asking developers to bear a larger share of the front-end burden of supplying new infrastructure and added services as a means of paying
for continued growth.”134 Moreover, cities are increasingly applying impact fees to different types of development to include
nonresidential land uses135 and even renovations of existing
properties.136
Local governments today also use exactions and impact
fees to fund a much wider range of services and facilities. As
recently as 1985, the vast majority of impact fees funded water
lines, sewers, and roads.137 More recent studies suggest that increasing numbers of local governments rely on impact fees for
other public services, including schools, low-income housing,
fire and emergency services, traffic mitigation, public transportation, and open space.138 A growing minority of communities
rely upon exactions to provide affordable housing as well. Linkage programs require developers, especially commercial developers in central cities, to agree to “offset” the anticipated costs
of the proposed development.139 San Francisco, for example, requires commercial developers seeking to “convert” residential
property to nonresidential uses to pay a substantial fee to offset
the anticipated loss of moderate-priced housing.140 Inclusionary
zoning programs impose similar requirements on residential
developers. Usually, inclusionary zoning rules require developers to set aside a certain percentage of new residential units for
“low- and moderate-income” residents and to sell or lease these
units to the targeted residents at “affordable” (i.e., below market) prices.141
Not surprisingly, the fastest growing communities are
most likely to impose fees,142 and impact fees have generally
134. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., “WHY NOT IN OUR COMMUNITY?”:
REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 8 (2004), available at http://
www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/wnioc.pdf.
135. See Been, supra note 128, at 140–42.
136. See, e.g., Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating Development Impact on Housing Costs, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1027 (1991).
137. Been, supra note 128, at 141.
138. See id. at 141 (describing the types of projects which impact fees fund).
139. See Schukoske, supra note 136, at 1015–27 (describing the characteristics and implementation of linkage fee programs).
140. See San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 92 (Cal. 2002).
141. See also Been, supra note 128, at 140–41; Robert C. Ellickson, The
Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1170–84 (1981).
142. See Been, supra note 128, at 142 (noting that “communities undergo-
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been championed as a way to internalize the full cost of new
development.143 As Vicki Been observes, “by requiring the developer and its customers to pay to mitigate the negative effects
a development may have on a neighborhood . . . impact fees
again may encourage efficiency by making the developer and
its customers internalize the full cost of the harms that the development causes.”144 This view is generally shared across the
political spectrum. For example, in the conservative Heritage
Foundation’s Guide to Smart Growth, Samuel Staley asserts
that “[p]roperty owners and developers should bear the full
costs of property development.”145 The idea that developers and
their customers should bear the full cost of new development is
rarely challenged, although both judges146 and economists have
questioned the ability of government to calibrate those costs accurately.147 Objections to exactions generally focus on policy design questions about the level and extent of exactions.148 There
is a significant concern that local governments may dramatically overcharge developers—that is, that impact fees do not
simply force newcomers to internalize the cost of new developments. Staley, for example, asserts that “fees are often abused
and become another source of general revenues for local governments.”149 His concerns are echoed in a recent report by the
ing the most growth . . . appear to be most likely to adopt fees”); cf. Andrejs K.
Saburskis & Mohammad Qadeer, An Empirical Estimation of the Price Effects
of Development Impact Fees, 29 URB. STUD. 653 (1992) (examining the relationship between land development and impact fees).
143. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 66–67.
144. Been, supra note 128, at 143.
145. Samuel R. Staley, Reforming the Zoning Laws, in A GUIDE TO SMART
GROWTH: SHATTERING MYTHS, PROVIDING SOLUTIONS 61, 73 (Jane S. Shaw &
Ronald D. Utt eds., 2000).
146. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 114, at 417–25 (discussing application
of “proportionality” review—which requires a relatively close connection between the exaction imposed and the impact of the proposed development—to
exactions and impact fees).
147. See ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 122 (arguing that
the “central premise of this trend—that responsibility for communal needs can
be allocated objectively to private parties—is largely a myth”); see also, e.g.,
Wes Clarke & Jennifer Evans, Development Impact Fees and the Acquisition of
Infrastructure, 21 J. URB. AFF. 281, 287 (1999) (noting that local officials may
use impact fees to slow growth, rather than to finance infrastructure).
148. See ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 122 (“[E]ven if one
accepts the basic premise underlying exaction usage, that all new development
should cover the full local cost of service expansion and mitigation attributable
to it, wide room exists for dispute about the scope and scale of exactions.”).
149. Staley, supra note 145, at 73; see also FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 67
(noting that exactions may “extract payments in excess of the social costs of
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Department of Housing and Urban Development, which warns
that many impact fees are “disproportionate to actual development costs” and unreasonably drive up the cost of housing as a
result.150
C. THE NEW-REGIONALIST SOLUTION
Opponents of metropolitan fragmentation have set forth a
variety of proposals to guarantee a more equitable distribution
of resources among the municipalities within a metropolitan
area.151 These “new-regionalist” proposals tend to advance the
same goals as so-called “smart-growth” policies.152 Both favor
directing growth within a metropolitan area through a variety
of planning mechanisms, including selectively channeling infrastructure subsidies to areas deemed appropriate for new
growth, such as suburban infill projects. New regionalists argue that decisions about land use and infrastructure policy
should be centralized to prevent fragmented local governments
from making decisions that exacerbate regional inequities. In
an example cited by Sheryll Cashin, between 1980 and 1990,
Chicago’s growing, affluent northwest suburbs—home to forty
percent of the region’s people—enjoyed the benefit of sixty percent of the regional highway expenditures.153 In response to
these disparities, new regionalists would take away local government’s power to make many fiscal decisions, including the
decision to invest in new infrastructure. Jerry Frug’s “regional

development”).
150. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 134, at 8.
151. See, e.g., Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note
9, at 1164–71 (arguing for regional general-purpose governments that would
assume many governmental functions currently carried out by cities); Cashin,
supra note 12, at 2034–47 (same); Ford, supra note 15, at 1909 (arguing that
local boundaries should be maintained but made more porous by permitting
cross-jurisdictional voting); Frug, Decentering, supra note 15, at 295 (proposing
a regional legislature).
152. Smart-growth advocates and new regionalists tend to use different
justifications for their policies. Smart-growth proponents seek to capitalize on
popular aversion to suburban growth to advance their agenda, whereas new
regionalists focus on the need to remedy intrametropolitan inequities. See, e.g.,
Cashin, supra note 12, at 2037–43 (noting the connection between regionalism
and smart growth and stating that “environmental and quality of life issues
offer a route to regionalism that may be more politically feasible . . . [and] that
ultimately address issues of social and economic fairness”).
153. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Public Subsidies and the Role of Suburbanization in Urban Economic Development: A Reply to Timothy Bates, 14 ECON.
DEV. Q. 242, 245 (2000).
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legislature” would be charged with “the allocation of entitlements to local governments.”154 Richard Ford would not only
make local governments more “permeable” by giving outsiders
a vote in local elections, but would also deprive cities of the
right to distribute local revenues. Instead, “a state legislature
or a regional administrative body could distribute [the revenues] according to egalitarian principles of need.”155 Similarly,
both Richard Briffault and Sheryll Cashin have argued in favor
of regional, general-purpose governments with the authority to
ensure an equitable distribution of revenues for physical infrastructure.156
Local governments in most metropolitan regions, however,
have proven stubbornly resistant to arguments that they
should surrender land use and infrastructure-planning authority in the name of interlocal equity. Important exceptions exist,
but are rare.157 For example, the decade-old political reorganization of Minnesota’s Twin Cities region is frequently applauded by both regional government and smart-growth proponents. Since 1994, the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities,
or Met Council, has exercised all sewer, transit, and land use
planning authority within the region.158 The Met Council’s
most important authority comes from its power to administer
all sewer and transportation funds for the seven counties and
188 cities in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. At
least theoretically, given the connection between infrastructure
and suburban growth, this authority allows the Met Council to
establish regional growth priorities and to remedy the excesses

154. Frug, Decentering, supra note 15, at 296.
155. Ford, supra note 15, at 1910.
156. See Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 9, at
1166 (arguing that the “optimal metropolitan area government” must have,
inter alia, the power to “collect and distribute [local] revenues in order to promote greater equalization of local fiscal capacity and local service quality” and
to “provide regionwide physical infrastructure”); Cashin, supra note 12, at
2041–42 (endorsing Briffault’s proposal).
157. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 12, at 2037–39 (discussing federally mandated infrastructure limits in Atlanta); Cashin, supra note 153, at 246 (discussing regional transportation authorities in Seattle and Portland). Regional
special-purpose local government units, such as transportation authorities,
provide some regionwide coordination in other metropolitan areas. See Gillette, supra note 12, at 204–06 (discussing costs and benefits of special purpose authorities). A handful of county-city government mergers also increase
regional coordination. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 50, at 503
(noting that city-county consolidations “have been extremely rare”).
158. See ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 13.
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and inequities of the previous system of fragmented authority.159 Moreover, each municipality in the region is required to
share a percentage of any annual growth in tax revenues, ostensibly to redistribute some of the benefits of the infrastructure investments received by growing communities.160
More recently, Maryland adopted a statewide infrastructure—based growth management program called the “Smart
Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Initiative.”161 Proponents bill the initiative as an “incentive-based” approach to
growth: state funds for infrastructure are channeled into designated “Priority Funding Areas.”162 Growth is not prohibited
outside of these areas, but state infrastructure funding is withheld unless the local government demonstrates that proposed
development meets certain state criteria, including a concurrency requirement. The Priority Funding Program accompanies
a Rural Legacy Program, which provides state funds to landowners to purchase conservation easements to protect rural
land from new development.163
III. EQUITY AS EXCLUSION?
The new-regionalist and smart-growth literature frequently contrasts the fortunes of two types of local governments—sprawling fringe suburbs and struggling central cities—and two groups of metropolitan residents—nouveau riche
McMansion owners and the urban poor.164 Opponents of metropolitan fragmentation blame the bad fortune of cities and their
residents on the selfishness of suburban governments and their
“consumer voters.” They therefore champion policies that seek

159. Id. at 135.
160. See Cashin, supra note 12, at 2036.
161. See, e.g., Parris N. Glendening, Maryland’s Smart Growth Initiative:
The Next Steps, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1497–1502 (2002) (describing the
Maryland program); J. Celeste Sakowicz, Urban Sprawl: Florida’s and Maryland’s Approaches, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377, 408–18 (2004).
162. See Glendening, supra note 161, at 1497.
163. See id. at 1497–98.
164. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 95, at 69 (asserting that “[e]ach decision
by residential or commercial real estate developers to build on the urban periphery rather than invest in central urban areas contributes to the woes of
the central city” and that this pattern “create[s] a predictable confluence of
harms . . . [that] fall most directly on central city residents who often are people of color and are most economically vulnerable”); Lee Anne Fennell, Homes
Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 620–54 (2002) (providing account of the distributional
consequences of metropolitan fragmentation).
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to curb suburban growth—including the infrastructure limitations outlined above—as a way to improve the fortunes of cities
and their poorest residents. These policies are initially appealing. If metropolitan fragmentation and suburban sprawl contributes to urban decline, then it seems self-evident that curbing growth will improve the fortunes of the urban poor. This
superficially attractive palliate, however, overlooks an important distinction between central cities and their residents: residents can move; cities cannot.
There are at least two reasons why this distinction is important. First, the reality of metropolitan fragmentation means
that most policies affecting the pace and scale of growth, such
as impact fees and adequacy-of-public-facilities requirements,
will be adopted by local governments with an incentive to exclude those of more moderate means. Infrastructure controls
may simply enhance a local government’s “fiscal zoning” toolbox. Dilworth’s book illustrates, after all, that local governments have used infrastructure policy to manage their growth
and identity for over a century. Second, even when imposed at
the regional level—which is not likely to be a political reality in
most places—infrastructure limitations, like all growth management techniques, still may limit intrametropolitan mobility
by reducing the supply of affordable housing.
A. NEW INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES AND COMMUNITY
EXCLUSION
The tendency of local governments to use land use regulations to exclude less desirable residents is well-known. As William Fischel recently demonstrated, the home owners who tend
to dominate local politics favor policies that maximize property
values, including zoning policies that favor single family
homes.165 Because homeowners are “richer [and] whiter” than
renters,166 these policies tend to exacerbate existing intrametropolitan inequities. This fact is well understood by the new
regionalists: exclusionary zoning frequently tops their list of
the evils associated with metropolitan fragmentation. Exclusionary zoning and growth controls also contribute to suburban
sprawl, both because exclusionary techniques (such as minimum lot size and square footage requirements) necessitate vast
165. FISCHEL, supra note 10; see also Fennell, supra note 164, at 634–35
(discussing why homevoter dominance leads to exclusionary zoning).
166. Fennell, supra note 164, at 628.
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amounts of land and because communities located on the urban
fringe are generally more willing to accept land uses rejected by
affluent “inner ring” suburbs. Older, wealthier suburbs exclude
new development, especially of less desirable land uses, effectively pushing it outward to communities with more lenient
land use policies. Over time, these newer communities seek to
curb their growth, and the cycle of exclusion and invitation repeats itself. The result is the sprawling “leapfrog” style development that characterizes our municipal areas.167
Infrastructure limitations also can serve as a highly effective fiscal zoning tool. As the Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing warned more than a decade
ago, “one of the most effective ways of limiting growth is to relate development to the availability of public services.”168 For
example, while some opponents of suburban growth criticized
concurrency policies for encouraging overinvestment in infrastructure,169 it is generally accepted that they are also used to
slow or stop new development. The connection between impact
fees and fiscal zoning is a more complicated one. A major study
of impact-fee practices conducted in 1989, for example, found
that communities generally do not consider impact fees to be
the most effective exclusionary device.170 Not surprisingly,
therefore, many communities imposing fees also utilize other

167. See Robert C. Ellickson, Monitoring the Mayor: Will the New Information Technologies Make Local Officials More Responsible?, 32 URB. LAW. 391,
399 (2000) (attributing urban sprawl to exclusionary zoning in established
suburbs); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise?, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 158, 163–65 (2001) (reviewing literature). On the connection between
growth controls and sprawl, see generally, for example, WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
DO GROWTH CONTROLS MATTER? (1990) (discussing the connection between
growth controls and sprawl). On the exclusionary effects and motives of
growth controls, see generally, for example, Arthur C. Nelson et al., The Link
Between Growth Management and Housing Affordability: The Academic Evidence, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 150–53 (Anthony
Downs ed. 2004); Michael H. Schill, Comment on Richard P. Voith & David L.
Crawford, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra, at
102–03; Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977) [hereinafter Ellickson, Suburban
Growth Controls].
168. ADVISORY COMM’N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUS.,
“NOT IN MY BACKYARD”: REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 2-2
(1991), http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/NotInMyBackyard.pdf.
169. See, e.g., Sakowicz, supra note 161, at 402; White & Paster, supra note
121, at 756.
170. See Joseph Gyourko, Impact Fees, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Density of New Development, 30 J. URB. ECON. 242 (1991).
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growth-management devices.171 Clearly exactions and impact
fees can, and have, been used to exclude unwanted development.172 The 1989 study also found those communities that do
believe fees are effective exclusionary devices impose higher
fees than communities that prefer other techniques.173 Another
study found that impact-fee use was highest in the lowestgrowth and highest-growth communities. (The highest levels
were found in the fastest growing communities.) The high levels of fees in high-growth communities obviously correlates
with a need for new infrastructure. Since low-growth communities generally do not face these same demands, one explanation
for the u-shaped pattern is that established communities use
fees to maintain their exclusive status.174
B. IMPACT FEES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY
As Michael Schill recently observed, “[t]he Achilles’ heel of
the ‘smart-growth’ movement is the impact that many of the
proposals put forth by its advocates would have on affordable
housing.”175 This is certainly the case with respect to new infrastructure policies. Consider, for example, impact fees levied on
a new suburban housing development. Even if the fees are not
adopted for exclusionary purposes, they will still drive up housing costs if they are levied in excess of the benefits received by
the housing consumer.176 When levied in excess of the benefit
received—as is frequently the case—impact fees will increase
housing costs either directly or indirectly, depending upon
whether the consumer, developer, or landowner bears the cost
of the fee.177 While housing consumers do not always pay im171. See Been, supra note 128, at 146.
172. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 134, at 5
(arguing that smart-growth techniques, including impact fees, are used to exclude affordable housing); see also Been, supra note 128, at 146–47.
173. Gyourko, supra note 170, at 244 (noting that “there is a statistically
significant positive correlation between the amount of the fee and the rating of
its exclusionary strength” among cities imposing fees).
174. See Been, supra note 128, at 146–47.
175. Schill, supra note 167, at 102. This collection contains an excellent recent sampling of the voluminous literature on the connection between growth
management and affordable housing.
176. See Been, supra note 128, at 148 (noting that consumers may benefit
from impact fees if they are more efficient, i.e., cheaper, than taxes, special
assessments or other funding mechanisms); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls, supra note 167, at 431–35 (discussing price effects of development
charges under various economic conditions).
177. Whether the consumer, the developer, or the initial landowner bears
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pact fees, they frequently do. It is obvious that housing developers will pass the cost of the fees onto housing consumers
whenever possible, in which case the fees will act to directly increase the price of housing. But, even when the developer or
landowner bears the cost of the fee, prices will still rise eventually because the amount of land developed will fall.178 In any of
these cases, the incidence of impact fees is regressive for the
same reason that the property tax is regressive—wealthier individuals spend less of their net worth on housing than poorer
ones.179 Empirical studies of the price effects of impact fees
demonstrate (unsurprisingly) that impact fees tend to raise the
price of housing significantly.180
One obvious response to the concern that new infrastructure policies increase housing prices is that the true victims of
fragmentation are the urban poor who have very little hope of
moving to the suburbs. It is commonly asserted that these individuals are trapped in desperately poor, segregated inner-city
communities.181 As I have elsewhere argued, policymakers certainly should be cognizant of the way that local policies affect
the lives of our most vulnerable citizens.182 However, there are
serious reasons to question accounts that suggest the poor have

the incidence of impact fees depends on the elasticities of supply and demand
for undeveloped land and new housing within a community. See Been, supra
note 128, at 150–53.
178. See Mark Skidmore & Michael Peddle, Do Development Impact Fees
Reduce the Rate of Residential Development?, 29 GROWTH & CHANGE 383, 392
(1998) (finding that introduction of impact fees correlated with a thirty percent
reduction in the number of new homes built). But see Christopher J. Mayer &
C. Tsuriel Somerville, Land Use Regulation and New Construction, 30 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 639 (2000) (finding that impact fees did not reduce
housing starts).
179. See Been, supra note 128, at 167.
180. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Evans-Cowley et al., The Effect of Development
Impact Fees on Land Values, 36 GROWTH & CHANGE 100 (2005); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & Timothy M. Shaughnessy, An Empirical Investigation of the Effects
of Impact Fees on Housing and Land Markets, 34 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON.
639 (2004); Shishir Mathur et al., The Effect of Impact Fees on the Price of New
Single-family Housing, 41 URB. STUD. 1303 (2004).
181. See Cashin, supra note 12, at 1987.
182. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Garnett, Ordering] (arguing that current property regulations may negatively affect the citizens of urban neighborhoods by
hindering efforts to cure social disorder); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from
Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 174 (2001) (arguing that policies prohibiting low-cost forms of private
transportation limit welfare recipients’ ability to find and maintain jobs).
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nothing to lose (or everything to gain) from higher housing
prices on the urban fringe.
First, Dilworth’s history itself provides an important reminder that the story of suburban expansion is one of urban
exodus. (Indeed, this exodus is a central problem with fragmentation, according to the new regionalists.) It is undoubtedly the
case that many suburbs, including some of the ones that Dilworth describes, practiced primitive forms of exclusionary zoning even before zoning laws began to sweep the country in the
1920s. The connection drawn by East Orange, New Jersey between expensive infrastructure and exclusive identity, discussed above, is an early illustration of this phenomenon.183
But other suburbs billed themselves as “workmen’s paradises”
and sought to use investments in public infrastructure to make
suburban life accessible to the urban masses. For example,
Dilworth describes the concern in Bayonne, New Jersey—a
community that rejected annexation in order to remain suburban—that improvements were needed to attract the “mass of
humanity” trapped in nearby New York.184 Kenneth Jackson
has also documented early efforts to relocate the urban poor to
suburban areas where Progressives, somewhat patronizingly,
believed they would lead healthier, more moral, and more
“American” lives.185
There remain strong reasons to favor policies that enable
the urban poor to relocate to the suburbs today. Importantly,
the “spatial mismatch” between the center-city poor and service
industry employment in the suburbs means that, in many
cases, willing workers simply cannot get to available jobs, even
when they know about them.186 There are reasons to indict
suburbanization for contributing to this mismatch, including
the asserted connection between suburbanization and urban
disinvestment and the fact that public transportation cannot
efficiently serve low-density suburban development. It remains
the case, however, that many poor people likely would be better

183. See DILWORTH, supra note 1 at 136, 182.
184. Id. at 135–36.
185. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 116–37; see also, e.g., Richard H. Chused,
Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597 (2001) (discussing
Progressive ideology motivating zoning laws).
186. E.g., Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.KENT L. REV. 795, 797–808 (1991) (reviewing voluminous literature supporting
this point).
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off if they could move to the suburbs, where jobs are more plentiful, public schools are better, and neighborhoods are safer.
While significant economic and regulatory impediments
continue to prevent many urban residents from moving to the
suburbs, the situation is not hopeless. On the contrary, the
1990s witnessed promising and dramatic declines in concentrations of poverty. Evidence from Census 2000 indicates that both
the absolute “number of high-poverty neighborhoods—census
tracts with a poverty rate of forty percent” or higher—and the
percentage of Americans living in these neighborhoods declined
by roughly one-fourth in the 1990s.187 The greatest decline in
concentrated poverty was experienced by poor African Americans: the percentage of African Americans living in highpoverty neighborhoods fell from 30.4 percent to 18.6 percent.188
American suburbs, interestingly, actually became poorer during this time period—a development that might be seen either
as a hopeful indicator of the intrametropolitan mobility of the
urban poor or as a harbinger of developing pockets of suburban
poverty.189
The need for affordable housing in the suburbs has been
made more acute because of the massive HOPE VI publichousing reforms, which fund the demolition of existing urban
high-rise projects and their replacement with lower-density,
mixed-income developments.190 Because the existing units will
not be replaced on a one-for-one basis, the program necessarily
entails an increasing reliance on Section 8 Housing Mobility
Vouchers. These HOPE VI projects are generally viewed as a
success in the popular press.191 Critics, however, assert that the
187. Paul A. Jargowsky, Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems: The Dramatic Decline of Concentrated Poverty in the 1990s, in 2 REDEFINING URBAN
AND SUBURBAN AMERICA 137, 142 (Alan Berube et al. eds., 2005).
188. Id. at 153.
189. See Alan Berube & William H. Frey, A Decade of Mixed Blessings: Urban and Suburban Poverty in Census 2000, in 2 REDEFINING URBAN AND
SUBURBAN AMERICA 111, supra note 187, at 111.
190. See generally Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, HOPE VI: A Vital Tool
for Comprehensive Neighborhood Revitalization, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y, 527 (2001) (describing and defending HOPE VI); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., HOPE VI PROGRAM AUTHORITY AND FUNDING HISTORY,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/fundinghistory.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (noting Hope VI was immediate response to the
Commission’s findings).
191. For recent commentary, see Jeanette Almada, Construction Begins on
Roosevelt Square Project, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2004, at 9; Ilene Lelchuk, Back
Home in North Beach: Residents of Project Glad to Return After Renovation,
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program “succeeds” by throwing out the neediest tenants, who
are deprived of the resources that they need to secure housing
and forced to resettle in equally dangerous and segregated
communities.192 Tenant-displacement studies tend to paint a
more hopeful picture: displaced tenants tended to relocate to
wealthier, more diverse neighborhoods—albeit to ones that remain relatively poor and segregated.193 Because of the critical
need for affordable housing in low-poverty areas, policies that
may drive the up the price of housing in the suburbs may undercut the success of the HOPE VI and Section 8 programs.194
Finally, leaving aside the question of urban-suburban mobility, suburban developments also play an entirely different
role in the provision of affordable housing. Many affordable
housing units come available through what housing economists
call “filtering.” Wealthier families in the U.S. tend to occupy
new housing—hence, suburban sprawl. As housing stock ages,

S.F. CHRON., Oct. 2, 2004, at B1; Brigid Schulte, New Public Housing Courts
Middle-Income Tenants; Chatham Square Replaces the Berg, WASH. POST,
Nov. 11, 2004, at T3; Eric Siegel, For O’Malley, a Legacy in Improvement,
Neighborhoods: The Mayor’s Strength May Be in Rebuilding, BALT. SUN, Sept.
16, 2004, at 2B; Leslie Williams, Home Sweet Home: Old St. Thomas Site
Blooms, City Officials Open River Garden, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Nov. 17, 2004, Metro, at 1.
192. See, e.g., Michael S. FitzPatrick, A Disaster in Every Generation: An
Analysis of Hope VI: HUD’s Newest Big Budget Development Plan, 7 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 421 (2000) (summarizing these arguments); NAT’L
HOUS. LAW PROJECT ET AL., FALSE HOPE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
HOPE VI PUBLIC HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (2002), http://www
.nhlp.org/html/pubhsg/FalseHOPE.pdf; NAT’L ALLIANCE OF HUD TENANTS &
NAT’L PUB. HOUS. TENANTS ORG., REPORT ON THE LOSS OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE U.S. (2002), http://www.saveourhomes.org/Senate_Report
.htm (summarizing data showing loss of subsidized housing attributable to
HOPE VI).
193. See LARRY BURON, URB. INST., AN IMPROVED LIVING ENVIRONMENT?
NEIGHBORHOOD OUTCOMES FOR HOPE VI RELOCATEES 1 (2004), http://www
.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311059_Roof_3.pdf (“Our findings indicate that relocatees generally moved to neighborhoods with lower levels of poverty, slightly
more racial diversity, and significantly less criminal activity.”); LARRY BURON
ET AL., URB. INST., THE HOPE VI RESIDENT TRACKING STUDY 78–93 (2002),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410591_HOPEVI_ResTrack.pdf (studying
818 households displaced by eight HOPE VI projects); SUSAN J. POPKIN, URB.
INST., THE HOPE VI PROGRAM—WHAT ABOUT THE RESIDENTS? 1 (2002),
http://www.urban.org/Uploaded PDF/310593_HopeVI.pdf (“The studies paint a
mixed picture, but on balance the story is generally positive. Many former
residents now live in better housing in less poor neighborhoods.”).
194. See SUSAN J. POPKIN & MARY K. CUNNINGHAM, URB. INST., SEARCHING FOR RENTAL HOUSING WITH SECTION 8 IN THE CHICAGO REGION (2000),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410314.pdf.

GARNETT_3FMT

494

12/22/2005 10:52:24 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:459

wealthier owners move and their original homes tend to “filter
down” to less-affluent individuals.195 New housing developments (even of expensive homes) therefore foster the filtering
process. If the chain of moves is disrupted—for example, because the price of new housing increases, leading wealthier individuals to remodel their existing home rather than move to
new ones—the pool of affordable housing will be reduced. Several studies suggest that impact fees affect the market for affordable housing in this way, that is, to cause existing units to
“filter up” to a less affordable market.196
C. THE REGIONAL PLANNING PANACEA
None of this is to say that new regionalists do not understand these perils. On the contrary, concerns about the exclusionary effects of local land use policies are frequently cited as
a primary reason why metropolitan infrastructure and planning authority should be centralized. New regionalists also understand the possibility that the kinds of policies they favor
might negatively impact affordable housing opportunities. But
again, centralized authority over infrastructure- and land use
policy is cited as an antidote to the problem. Properly implemented, the argument goes, regional planning can minimize
the regressive effects of, for example, policies that seek to
“channel” and “internalize” infrastructure costs. New regionalists argue that in the best-case scenario, the careful implementation of other planning tools—linkage and inclusionary zoning,
density bonuses, impact-fee waivers, and mixed-use zoning—
actually may increase the supply of affordable housing.197
While there is simply not enough evidence to know
whether affordability-promoting policies can effectively counteract the regressive effects of growth management,198 there
are a number of reasons to question the “perfect planning” corrective. First, policymakers may lack the political will to adopt
effective affordability-promoting policies. For example, Americans’ preference for low-density development and opposition to
sprawl might lead regional planners to favor growth controls to

195. Ellickson, supra note 141, at 1184–85.
196. Been, supra note 128, at 165–66.
197. See, e.g., Richard P. Voith & David L. Crawford, Smart Growth and
Affordable Housing, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT & AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra note 167, at 82, 86–100.
198. See Been, supra note 128, at 168.
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the exclusion of efforts that promote denser, more diverse, development.199 Second, inclusionary zoning programs might
themselves slow the filtering process and reduce the supply of
affordable housing. Or, even if the effect on filtering is minimal,
inclusionary zoning tends to provide a relatively small supply
of housing for moderate-income, rather than poor, families.200
Third, regional planning that fails to address the regressivity problem actually may exacerbate the housing affordability
crisis to an even greater extent than locally imposed growth
limits. As Vicki Been has argued, competition between municipalities for development may provide an important political
check on the price of exactions and impact fees.201 But, the entire point of regional planning is to prevent this kind of competition by preventing local governments from either overpricing
or underpricing new development within their jurisdiction. The
housing-affordability concerns raised by regional planning proposals were highlighted during the 2002 election cycle, when
statewide growth control initiatives were defeated by voters in
Colorado and Arizona.202 These proposals, which essentially
would have mandated Portland-esque growth-boundary models, were wildly popular until housing developers and lowincome housing advocates combined forces to oppose them. In
Colorado, Habitat for Humanity took a public stand on an initiative for the first time in their history—expressing concerns
that statewide planning would shrink the pool of affordable
housing.
Fourth, infrastructure policies that seek to force new owners to internalize the cost of their mobility raise transitional
fairness concerns. Public opinion polls consistently find that
substantial majorities of both renters and owners believe that
people are better-off owning their homes.203 A majority of
Americans also consider a single-family home in the suburbs to
be the most attractive housing option and are willing to make
199. See Garnett, supra note 167, at 161–64; Schill, supra note 167; see also
Sakowicz, supra note 161, at 416 (raising this concern about Maryland program).
200. Ellickson, supra note 141, at 1194–96.
201. See Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473,
509–28 (1991).
202. See Garnett, supra note 167, at 165–76.
203. See Fennell, supra note 164, at 627; FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DEMAND FOR HOUSING: 2002 NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY, available at http://
www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/media/survey/survey2002.pdf.
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significant financial sacrifices—and commute long distances—
to live in one.204 A number of commentators have questioned
the fairness of asking newcomers to suburbia to pay directly,
through impact fees, for infrastructure which was previously
funded by tax revenues.205 Regionally imposed impact fees may
exacerbate these equity concerns for two reasons. First, if regionally imposed fees are excessive, and the overcharge is used
as a supplementary revenue source, then existing homeowners
in established suburbs will have succeeded in extracting rents
from new homeowners in fringe suburbs. Second, even perfectly
calibrated fees may signal to suburban newcomers that they
are being required to “pay twice”—first to fund their own improvements directly and again through tax revenues for services provided to older homes.206 (Locally imposed exactions
may reduce this possibility to the extent that metropolitan
fragmentation frequently guarantees that many neighbors are
similarly situated.) These transitional fairness problems have
both a generational and a racial component.207 In 2004, Americans over the age of fifty-five were nearly twice as likely to own
their homes as those under thirty-five (81 percent versus 43
percent).208 Moreover, homeownership rates are highest for
whites (75 percent), but minority homeownership rates continue to rise, with nearly half of all African Americans and
Hispanics owning homes.209 It would be unfortunate if new infrastructure policies had the effect of slowing these impressive
gains.

204. Garnett, supra note 167, at 177–78.
205. See supra Part II. The actual “fairness” of this situation depends on a
number of factors, including, as discussed above, whether the property owner
receives amenities equal to or exceeding the impact fee, the extent to which
the fees reduce later tax burdens, etc.
206. On impact fees and transitional fairness, see Been, supra note 128, at
147; Reynolds, supra note 114, at 430–34. On the transitional fairness problem generally, see Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1657 (1999).
207. See Been, supra note 128, at 166 (“If impact fees have a greater impact on first-time homebuyers, for example, that may have different impacts
on racial minorities . . . because so many more Caucasians than minorities already own their own homes.”).
208. See U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership
Ann. Stat.: 2004, Table 15, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/
annual04/ann04t15.html.
209. See U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership
Ann. Stat.: 2004, Table 20, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/
annual04/ann04t20.html.
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Finally, it is critical to consider how new-regionalist
“channeling” priorities might affect the promising trend toward
suburban racial diversity. Evidence from the 2000 Census
shows that minorities comprise 27 percent of suburban populations (up from 19 percent a decade earlier).210 The most diverse
suburbs are found in western metropolitan areas which are
characterized by the low-density, sprawling development that
draws the ire of smart-growth proponents.211 Moreover, the
available data also suggests that it is important to increase the
supply of “starter homes” in the suburbs because these new
neighborhoods tend to be more racially diverse than older
neighborhoods.212 New-regionalist policies may well reduce
these housing opportunities because “starter-home” developments are frequently located in the fast-growing communities
on the urban fringe that fall low on the infrastructure priority
list.
CONCLUSION
By returning us to the time when the American metropolitan landscape was just unfolding, Richardson Dilworth provides a welcome opportunity to consider the relative merit of
subsidizing suburban growth and suburban political autonomy
through infrastructure policy. Over the past three decades, opponents of suburban growth have successfully fought to reverse
decades of infrastructure policy in order to curb sprawl. More
recently, the new regionalists have made a sophisticated case
for using these new infrastructure strategies to address the ills
associated with metropolitan fragmentation. This Essay has
sought to examine the implications of infrastructure-based
growth-management strategies for late-comers to American
prosperity.
Admittedly, I have no grand plan to solve all of the problems associated with metropolitan fragmentation. But, as I
have previously argued, it is critical for cities to evaluate how
their own land use policies affect the health and vitality of ur210. William H. Frey, Melting Pot Suburbs: A Study of Suburban Diversity,
in 1 REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS
2000, at 155, 155 (Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang eds., 2003).
211. Racial diversity rose most sharply in so-called “Melting Pot metros”
with large and growing Hispanic and Asian-American populations. Id. at 155–
62. Southern cities have also experienced significant gains in minority suburbanization, largely attributable to Black migration to the suburbs.
212. Been, supra note 128, at 164.
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ban communities.213 There is a risk that the metropolitan fragmentation will give cities an excuse to avoid inward-looking reforms that may hold the most promise for urban regeneration
as well as city-suburb cooperation. Dilworth’s study emphasizes
the danger of relying too heavily on the regional blame game.
Suburbanites then, as now, resisted joining forces with their
urban neighbors in part because of their justified concerns
about the health and efficiency of urban governance. In his introduction and conclusion, Dilworth suggests that things might
have been different. If only the Greater Newark movement had
succeeded, for example, then our cities might not be struggling
islands of dysfunction surrounded by a sea of selfish and
wealthy municipal neighbors. The central difficulty with this
argument is the fact that Dilworth’s case studies tend to undermine it. While Dilworth presents evidence connecting infrastructure development and metropolitan fragmentation, he also
makes fragmentation seem almost inevitable: as soon as the
suburbanites that he studies could remain autonomous, they
did.
When I read Dilworth’s book, I experienced déjà vu. I live
in an urban neighborhood in South Bend, Indiana, less than
one mile from what remains of a once vibrant downtown. Over
the past four decades, South Bend lost a sizable percentage of
its population, while at the same time it grew geographically
through annexation.214 This is a common story for many “Rust
Belt” cities, thanks in large part to the precipitous decline of
the Midwestern industrial base and the out-migration of residents and businesses to surrounding suburban communities.
But South Bend hardly has clean hands. For example, although
sizable territorial gains have done nothing to stem the economic and population spiral, the city’s main economic develop-

213. See Garnett, Ordering, supra note 182; accord, JERRY J. SALAMAN ET
AL.¸THE N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URB. POL’Y, 1999
REPORT: REDUCING THE COST OF NEW HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IN NEW YORK
CITY (1999), http://www.law.nyu.edu/realestatecenter/CREUP_Papers/cost_

study_1999/Summary.pdf (analyzing the regulatory impediments to new housing construction in New York City and concluding that regulatory reform
could reduce rents charged by nearly 30 percent).
214. Between 1960 and 2000, the city population declined from 132,445 to
107,789. During this same time period, the city increased in size from twentyfour to thirty-nine square miles. Dep’t of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., City of S. Bend,
City Plan, http://www.southbendcityplan.org/Plan.htm (last visited Nov. 10,
2005).
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ment strategy in past years has been annexation.215 Interestingly, many of the area’s wealthy residential subdivisions are
located in unincorporated territory, where residents enjoy few
city services. Despite the fact that the city would be obligated to
provide services to these developments upon annexation—
importantly, to replace well-and-septic with sewer-and-water
systems—residents oppose annexation with such vehemence
that they succeeded in securing a state legislative act prohibiting South Bend from annexing them.216 South Bend is currently in the process of adopting a city plan. During this process, the city would do well to consider ways to make South
Bend a better place to live—for example, amending the zoning
code to permit more mixed-use development. These relatively
small regulatory changes would not transform South Bend
overnight, but they would begin to address why so many who
can leave, do.

215. See Dep’t of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., City of S. Bend, Annexation Policy
http://www.ci.south-bend.in.us/redevelopment/Community%
and
Plan,
20Branch/Annexation.htm#AnnexC (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
216. This law was recently invalidated as illegal “special legislation” burdening one municipality. City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 693–
696 (Ind. 2003); cf. Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note 43, at 1116 (noting that special- or local-legislation bans were “designed to curb state efforts to
control detailed city decisionmaking by specific legislation”). Communities like
unincorporated Granger, Indiana—where many of my friends and colleagues
live—are motivated by economics as much as or more than antiurban bias. Cf.
Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1849
(2003) (describing low-density, “low-cost geographies” where wealthier residents move to lessen need for city services).

